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Animated models explicating how a problem is solved an  why a particular method is chosen 
are expected to be effective learning tools for novices, especially when abstract cognitive 
processes or concepts are involved. Cognitive load theory was used to investigate how 
learners could be stimulated to engage in genuine learning activities. It was hypothesized that 
illusion of control would impede transfer performance compared to a condition without 
illusion of control. Moreover, we hypothesized that learners who first studied an animated 
model and then solved the same problem would perform better on transfer than learners who 
studied the same animated model twice or who first solved the problem and then studied the 
animated models. In a 2 x 3 factorial experiment (N = 90) with the factors illusion of control 
(yes vs. no) and instruction method (study-practice, practice-study, study-study) only the first 
hypothesis was confirmed. Implications for the design of animated models are discussed. 
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Observational Learning from Animated Models: Effects of Studying-Practicing Alternation 
and Illusion of Control on Transfer 
Observing a model that performs the desired actions and behavior has been a 
successful and well researched instructional technique for the last 30 years in the field of 
motor learning (McCullagh, Weiss, & Ross, 1989; Wetzel, Radtke, & Stern, 1994; Wulf & 
Shea, 2002). The application of cognitive modeling in learning environments that focus on 
problem solving and reasoning in a variety of domains is increasingly advocated by modern 
educational theories (Collins, Brown, & Newman, 1989; Jonassen, 1999; van Merriënboer, 
1997). Cognitive modeling concerns covert cognitive processes that have to be explicated in 
order to become observable for a learner. At the same time, rapid developments in computer 
and software technology in the last decades have enabl d the use of dynamic visualizations, 
such as animations and video, to illustrate abstract cognitive processes or concepts (Casey, 
1996; Chee, 1995). In addition, developments in computer technology have facilitated the 
authoring and application of pedagogical agents, that is, computer-based characters that 
support learners with verbal feedback and guidance in order to engage them in more active 
learning (Clarebout, Elen, Johnson, & Shaw, 2002). We refer to the combined use of 
animations with textual explanations and pedagogical agents in cognitive modeling as 
animated models. These animated models illustrate the solving of problems such as scientific 
problems (e.g., solving a problem about gravity), mathematical problems (e.g., probability 
calculation problems), or search problems (finding information on the Internet).  
The pedagogical agent functions as a social model and guides the learner through the 
animation. This guidance pertains to some of the beneficial effects of cognitive modeling. To 
start with, the agent may clarify not only how a problem is solved, but also why a specific 
method has been chosen. Secondly, the agent may help learners to avoid typical errors by 
guiding their attention to specific parts of the animation and provide explanatory text. 
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For example, in solving a problem in the domain of pr bability calculation, it is 
important to know whether it is a ‘drawing with or without replacement’. For novices this 
concept may be rather abstract and difficult to understand. An animation can visualize the 
concept by showing what is happening, for instance, in a situation with mobiles. Imagine a 
mobile factory where on an assembly line six mobiles -each with a distinct color- are packed 
in a box. A controller blindly selects two mobiles to check them for deficiencies. The learner 
has to calculate the probability that the controlle draws a yellow and a blue mobile from the 
box. The animated model may show a box with six mobiles. The first mobile that is drawn 
from the box can be visibly moved aside from the box. As is shown in Figure 1, the 
pedagogical agent may move to the drawn mobile and explain that a mobile that is drawn 
should not be put back because you do not want to draw an already checked mobile again. 
Then the group of remaining mobiles in the box becomes encircled. The pedagogical agent 
moves to the box with mobiles and explains that the second mobile will be selected from the 
remaining mobiles. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
A potential danger of showing the performance of a complex task with animations and textual 
explanations is that the limited cognitive capacity of learners might become overloaded. A 
theory that tries to align the structure of information and the way it is presented with human 
cognitive architecture is cognitive load theory (CLT: Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003, 2004; 
Sweller, 1988, 1999, 2004; Sweller, van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998; van Merriënboer & 
Sweller, 2005). For the processing of information two structures in human cognitive 
architecture are crucial. Working memory, where all conscious processing of information 
takes place, only has a limited processing capacity that is by far inadequate to meet the 
complexity of information that learners face in modern learning environments. The second 
structure, long-term memory, is a knowledge base with a virtually unlimited capacity that can 
serve as added processing capacity by means of schemas. Schemas comprise cognitive 
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structures in which separate information-elements are aggregated in one specialized element 
that can be processed by working memory as a single element (Paas et al., 2003). CLT 
identifies three types of cognitive load. The first type, intrinsic cognitive load, is caused by 
the complexity of the subject matter and cannot be altered without compromising 
sophisticated understanding (Paas et al., 2004). The two other types of cognitive load are 
caused by the way that information is presented (Paas et al., 2004). The second type, 
extraneous or ineffective cognitive load, is imposed on working memory because of poorly 
designed instructional material. The third type, germane or effective cognitive load is imposed 
when information is presented in such a way that learning is enhanced, that is, when it 
facilitates the construction and/or automation of cognitive schemas. Examples of such 
activities are elaborating, abstracting, and inferring. The three types of cognitive load are not 
isolated but act as additive components. The combined load of these components cannot 
exceed the available cognitive capacity and, consequently, the high load of one component is 
at the cost of another component. From an instructional design point of view, especially 
extraneous cognitive load and germane cognitive load should be considered as 
communicating vessels as the reduction of extraneous c gnitive load can free cognitive 
resources for an increase in germane cognitive load (P as et al., 2003). An important objective 
of CLT is to avoid that learners spent mental effort on activities that do not contribute to 
learning (i.e., decrease ineffective cognitive load) nd to promote mental effort on activities 
that contribute to learning (i.e., increase effective cognitive load). The central question in this 
study is how learners can be stimulated to invest effort in their learning, that is, increase 
germane cognitive load. We will investigate this question from two perspectives. The first 
departs from the stance that cognitive load theorists increasingly emphasize the motivational 
aspects of learning (Gerjets & Scheiter, 2003; Paas et l., 2003; Paas, Tuovinen, van 
Merriënboer, & Darabi, 2005; van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005) and that motivation is 
assumed to be a major contributor to the willingness of learners to engage in genuine learning 
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activities (van Merriënboer & Ayres, 2005). However, for learning to commence, 
instructional strategies have to be used that effectively guide the learner’s investment of 
mental effort and take account of the learner’s limited cognitive capacity. This is the focus of 
the second perspective that builds on the assumption that learners have to be stimulated to 
engage in some kind of active processing of the learning material in order to understand it 
(Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Mayer, 2001; Wittrock, 1974).  
A theoretically potential instructional technique to increase the motivation of learners 
is to allow them to control the learning process (Kinzie, 1990). However, reviews focusing on 
several dimensions of learner control are not conclusive with respect to the benefits of 
learning control (Kay, 2001; Lin & Hsieh, 2001; Niemiec, Sikorski, & Walberg, 1996; 
Williams, 1996). In a review Skinner (1996) has classified the multiplicity of constructs of 
control. One of the most fundamental distinctions is that between the actual control (i.e., the 
objective control conditions in the context) and perceived control (i.e., the beliefs about the 
amount of control that is available). The term illusion of control is sometimes used when 
people have high perceived control in situations that are objectively uncontrollable (Skinner, 
1996; Langer, 1975). This raises the question what ill occur when learners believe that they 
have more control over the learning environment than actually can be exerted.  
Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957) argues that individuals seek 
consistency among their cognitions (i.e., beliefs, opinions, and observations) and that a 
dissonance will occur in the case of an inconsistency between these cognitions. For example, 
participants in a study on the effects of control and effort on the cardiovascular and the 
endocrine systems were notified beforehand that they could exert control over the intensity of 
noise during task performance. However, in reality only the participants in the control 
conditions were allowed to actually exert this contr l over the noise. Participants who could 
not control the intensity of the noise, although they were told they could, experienced higher 
levels of stress, indicated by higher activation of the sympathetic nervous system (e.g., higher 
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blood pressure) which is associated with stressing factors (Peters et al., 1998). In addition, 
some evidence exists that cognitive dissonance may undermine task performance (Elliot & 
Devine, 1994; Pallak & Pittman, 1972). The perceived control can be regarded as a cognition 
in the sense that it is a belief of a learner, whereas the actual or objective level of control is 
considered a cognition since it is an observation made by a learner. Under this assumption, an 
inconsistency and thus a negative effect on learning may occur when learners expect more 
control than they can actually employ. Some additional support comes from the locus of 
control literature. The locus of control is concerned with the question whether success or 
failure of activities can be attributed to one self (internal locus of control) or to other factors 
(external locus of control) (Kinzie, 1990). In general an internal locus of control is believed to 
increase intrinsic motivation, which is associated with better performance (Fazey & Fazey, 
2001). In order to develop a sense of internal locus of control, it is argued that the learning 
environment must be obviously responsive to learner choices-individuals must perceive that 
the relevant changes in the instruction are a result of their decisions (Lepper, 1985). With 
illusion of control the learning environment is obviously not responsive to learner choices and 
no sense of internal locus of control may develop. Consequently, it can be argued that illusion 
of control may hamper learning. 
Research has shown that novices benefit from instructional methods that have learners study 
worked out solutions of problems (see for a review van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005). 
Despite these benefits there are also some disadvantages. To start with, the passivity inherent 
to only studying worked out solutions may undermine the motivation of learners. Secondly, 
the method may result in learning only stereotypical solutions for problems that may not be 
applicable to problems that differ from the ones learn d during training (Sweller et al, 1998). 
Finally, once a learner understands the rationale behind the worked out solutions, the 
presentation of this information in yet more worked out solutions will become redundant and 
the cognitive load will turn from germane to extraneous (Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). In 
Observational Learning from Animated     8 
addition, evidence is accumulating that active processing of learning material facilitates 
learning. In this respect the generation of self-explanations, in which learners try to explain 
the rationale of a problem solution to themselves, ha  proven to be an effective instructional 
method (Chi et al., 1989; Renkl, 1997; Renkl & Atkinson, 2002; Roy & Chi, 2005). Also the 
provision of example-practice pairs, that is, learnrs first study a worked out solution and 
subsequently try to solve a similar problem themselves, has proved to be an effective way to 
introduce problem solving elements (Reisslein, Atkinson, Seeling, & Reisslein, 2006; Sweller 
& Cooper, 1985; Trafton & Reiser, 1993). For novices, however, engaging in new problems 
after studying an example may impose such a high conitive load that negative learning 
effects may occur. Therefore, the completion strategy, in which the problem is only solved 
partly and the learner has to complete the solution, has been proposed. An alternative for the 
completion strategy in which self-explanations and worked out solutions are combined, is the 
conjunction of first studying a worked-out solution a d subsequently solving the same 
problem. During the study stage of the studying-practice sequence learners can process 
specific information. This would be a problem when they start with practicing the problem 
solving skill because of the high demand on cognitive resources. 
 During the study stage the learners will construct a preliminary schema. 
Subsequently, this schema can be further refined with the information that is obtained during 
the practice stage when the learners perform skill them selves (Shea, Wright, Wulf, & 
Whitacre, 2000; Weeks & Anderson, 2000; Wulf & Shea, 2002). The altrnation between first 
studying and then problem solving enriches the schema and also helps learners to integrate 
newly learned information with prior knowledge, whic  yields a more integrated knowledge 
base with increased accessibility, better recall, and higher transfer of learning. 
In learning from animated models in the domain of pr bability calculation we 
hypothesize that task performance will enhance for learners whose expectations regarding 
control match the control than they can actually employ compared to learners whose 
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expectations regarding control do not match the actual control. Moreover, we hypothesize that 
the alternation of studying an animated model and then solving the same problem will result 
in more elaborated schemas than arrangements in which learners only study animated models 
or first solve the problem and then study the problem solution in the animated model. In a 
factorial design with the factors Illusion of Control (No, Yes) and Instructional method 
(Studying-Practicing, Practicing-Studying, Studying-Studying) we predict that learners in the 
condition with no illusion of control will yield higher transfer performance compared to 
learners in the illusion of control condition. Furthermore, we predict that learners in the 
Studying-Practicing condition will outperform learne s in the Practicing-Studying and 
Studying-Studying conditions on transfer performance. 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 90 pupils of pre-university education in the Netherlands (51 females 
and 39 males). Their mean age was 15.7 years (SD = .72). The participants were paid 10 euro 
for their collaboration. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. 
This resulted in 15 participants in each of the conditions.  
Computer-based learning environment 
The computer-based learning environment was developed with Flash MX and 
consisted of the following parts: a prior knowledge test, an instructional component and an 
assessment component. All parts were user timed, that is, the participants could decide how 
much time they spent on each part. The experiment started with a prior knowledge test of 8 
open questions and 4 multiple choice questions of varying difficulty. An example of such an 
open question is: 
‘You are playing a game with some friends and it isyour turn to throw a dice. If you 
throw sixes you win. What is the probability that you throw sixes?’ 
An example of a multiple choice question is: 
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‘You have a deck of cards from which you select 4 cards. You want to get an ace, 
king, queen and jack in this specific order. Does it matter whether you put back the 
selected cards before each new selection or not?  
a. Yes, your chances increase when you put back the selected cards  
b. Yes, your chances decrease when you put back the selected cards  
c. No, your chances remain the same whether you put back the selected cards or not 
d. This depends on the number of jokers in the deck of cards’ 
The level of prior knowledge was measured to serve as a covariate in the case that differences 
in prior knowledge would occur (although participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
six conditions). 
The instructional component consisted of an introduction to probability calculation and the 
experimental treatment.  The introduction comprised a brief explanation of concepts in 
probability calculation, such as randomization, individual events, complex events, and how 
counting can be used in calculating the probability. After this introduction, which was 
identical for all six groups, participants received condition-specific information about the 
learning environment. With a continue button the participant could start the experimental 
treatment in which eight problems in probability calculation had to be solved. The probability 
calculation problems were grouped in four problem categories which resulted from two 
important characteristics in probability calculation: The order of drawing (relevant vs. 
irrelevant) and replacement of drawing (without replacement vs. with replacement). For each 
problem category two problems were presented to enabl  learners to recognize structural 
similarities and dissimilarities between problems and thus learn not only how to solve 
problems but also when to apply which procedure. An example of such a problem is  
‘In a factory mobile phones are produced. On a production line the mobiles receive a 
cover in one of six colors before they are packed in a box. Each box contains six 
mobiles in the colors red, black, blue, yellow, green, and pink. Before a box leaves the 
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factory two mobiles are selected randomly and checked on deficiencies. What is the 
probability that you select the yellow and the blue mobile from one box?’ 
The factor Illusion of control was operationalized in the following way. Beside some 
condition-specific information all participants received the following information: 
‘You will see a screen with 8 buttons. Each button refers to a problem in probability 
calculation. TAKE CARE! Although some problems look similar, they are really 
different. You have to select each button (and thus each problem), but you are free to 
select the order. Buttons that you have selected will be disabled. In the upper right 
corner of the screen with the buttons is a list in which the problems that you have 
selected are colored in red.’ 
The participants were notified that all the buttons had to be selected, but that they were free to 
select the order of the buttons. This information was given to the participants to generate 
expectations about the control they could exert over th  order in which they selected problems 
during the instruction. In the illusion of control condition a mismatch between expected an 
actual control was realized with two manipulations. First, as shown in Figure 1 the buttons 
had meaningless names so that in fact they did not know what they selected. Second, the 
learning environment was adjusted in such a way that the problems were always presented in 
the same order as listed in the upper right corner.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
So, whether a learner for the first time pressed th button with the caption ‘Problem 7’ or the 
button with the caption ‘Problem 4’, the learning environment would start with the ‘Mountain 
bike ride 1’ problem. Regardless which button the learner pressed the second time, the 
‘Footrace’ problem would be the second problem thatwould be presented. Although learners 
in this condition expected control over the problem selection, they gradually became aware 
that there was no control.   
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In the condition with no illusion of control these manipulations were not implemented. As 
shown in Figure 2 the buttons had meaningful names. In this condition they had the control 
that they expected. First, they had information about the problems they could select. Second, 
the learning environment was adjusted in such a way th t it responded to the selection of the 
learner. So, when a learner would select the ‘Pin code’ problem, this problem was presented. 
Learners in this condition expected control over th problem selection and could employ this 
control during the experiment. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
The animated models in all conditions were continuous and learner paced, that is, 
learners could use a pause and play button. Each animated model lasted 120 seconds. The 
problem-solving process in each animated model was completed with supportive written 
explanations by a pedagogical agent, which was imple ented as a dolphin. The animated 
pedagogical agent moved across the screen to focus the learners’ attention while explaining 
and demonstrating one of two possible problem-solving processes. The method of individual 
events was applied in four animated models and implies that, first, the probability of 
individual events is calculated separately and, subsequently, the complex event is calculated 
by multiplying the individual events. For example, in the ‘Checking mobiles’ problem first 
the probability of selecting the yellow and the blue mobile was calculated (respectively 2/6 
and 1/5) and these two probabilities were subsequently multiplied for calculating the 
probability of the complex event. The method of counting was applied in the other four 
animated models. This method implies that all possible combinations are balanced by the 
correct number of combinations. For example, suppose s meone calculates the probability to 
guess a PIN code consisting of 4 figures. For each figure 10 different numbers (0 up to and 
including 9) can be chosen, whereas for 4 figures 10*10*10*10, that is 10.000, possible 
combinations can be chosen of which only one combinatio  is correct. In the animated 
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models the pedagogical agent explicated which considerations underlie the choice of one of 
the two methods.  
The learning environment was configured in such a way that it could run in six modes 
reflecting the six conditions. In the two study-study conditions the participants observed an 
animated model in which a problem was solved two times in succession. In the two study-practice 
conditions learners observed an animated model in wh ch a problem was solved once. 
Subsequently, the description of the same problem appe red on the screen with a text box below it 
in which they could solve the problem. Learners were fo ced to spend a minimum of 120 seconds 
solving the problem. When they tried to continue before the 120 seconds had passed, a message 
appeared suggesting to look again at the solution they had given. In the two practice-study 
conditions learners received a description of the problem on the screen with a text box in which 
they could solve the problem. The same time constrai ts nd message were applied as in the 
study-practice conditions. After pressing a continue b tton an animated model was started, 
showing the solution of the problem they had just solved. 
The three conditions with no illusion of control (no illusion of control /study-study, no 
illusion of control /study-practice, no illusion ofcontrol /practice-study) were identical to the three 
conditions with illusion of control (in order, illusion of control /study-study, illusion of control 
/study-practice, illusion of control /practice-study), with the exception that learners could 
determine the order of the problems they engaged in. In all conditions, after each problem, the 
participants were asked to score the mental effort they perceived when they engaged in the 
instructional activity on a one-item 9-point rating scale based on Paas (1992; see also Paas et al., 
2003). This scale ranged from ‘very, very little effort’ to ‘very, very much effort’. 
After the instructional component with the eight problems an assessment component 
followed consisting of twelve transfer tasks. Of the welve tasks, eight tasks were near 
transfer tasks. The near transfer items were analogous to the problems that were solved in the 
animated models. The following is an example of a ne r transfer task: 
Observational Learning from Animated     14 
‘In a pop music magazine you see an ad in the rubric FOR SALE in which a ticket for 
a spectacular concert of your favorite pop group is offered. Unfortunately the last 2 
digits of the telephone number, where you can obtain information about the ticket, are 
not readable anymore. You really like to have the ticke  and decide to choose the 2 
digits randomly. What is the probability that you dial the correct digits on your first 
trial?’ 
The remaining four items were far transfer items. These far transfer items were different from 
the problems solved in the animated models. Take for instance the following example of a far 
transfer task: 
‘In order to determine the final mark for a subject your teacher uses two 
complementary methods. First, you have to perform a practice task, followed by a test 
consisting of 8 multiple-choice questions. One out of five possible practice tasks 
(named A, B, C, D and E) is randomly assigned to you. You know you have done 
practice on task E a month ago. For the multiple choice questions your teacher uses a 
large pool of 100 different multiple-choice questions from which he randomly selects 
8 questions for you. Also in this respect you have made a test before with 8 questions 
from this pool. What is the probability that you are assigned practice task E as well as 
the 8 questions you have had before?’ 
This far transfer task comprises a problem from a specific problem category, that is, order is 
not important and without replacement (the drawing of the multiple choice items), which has 
to be combined with one individual event (the practice ask). 
After each transfer task the participants were asked to score the mental effort they 
perceived when they solved the transfer task on a oe-item 9-point rating scale based on Paas 
(1992; see also Paas et al., 2003). This scale ranged from ‘very, very little effort’ to ‘very, 
very much effort’. 
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Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in one session and was run in the computer rooms of 
the participating schools. After welcoming the participants, the experimenter gave them a 
code to log in on the experimental environment. When t  participants entered the 
environment, on the computer screen the purpose of the experiment was explained and an 
outline was given of the different parts of the expriment. First, the prior knowledge test was 
conducted. The instruction phase started after the prior knowledge test with the brief 
introduction to probability calculation. After reading the introduction they could press a 
continue button to engage in the experimental treatm n . After each problem, participants 
were asked to score their perceived mental effort. By pressing a button they could then 
proceed to the selection screen in which they could se ect the next problem. Following the 
instruction phase a transfer test was administered. Participants could use a calculator as well 
as scrap paper during the transfer test. All input to the calculator was logged and the scrap 
paper was collected after the experiment. After each transfer item they were asked to score 
their invested mental effort. Finally, the participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
Scoring 
For each open question of the prior knowledge test a li t of correct answers was 
formulated. For each correct answer 1 point was assigned, otherwise 0 points. Computational 
errors were ignored and no partial credit was awarded. For each correct multiple-choice 
question participants received 1 point, otherwise they received 0 points. In total the maximum 
on the prior knowledge test could be 12 points. Themental effort scores that were 
administered after each problem were summed across all eight problems and divided by 8, 
resulting in an average score on mental effort ranging from 1 to 9. For each near and far 
transfer task a list of correct answers was formulated. Computational errors were ignored and 
no partial credit was awarded. Each near and far transfer item was assigned 1 point when it 
Observational Learning from Animated     16 
was correct and 0 points when it was incorrect. The maximum for the transfer tasks was 
therefore 12 points. The mental effort scores after solving the transfer tasks were tallied up 
and divided by 12, resulting in an average score for mental effort on transfer ranging from 1 
to 9. Instruction time (in s) was defined as the time that the participants needed for the 
introduction (the basic theory of probability calculation) and the instruction component (the 
time spent on the eight problems). The time (in s) eeded to accomplish the transfer tasks was 
logged by the computer. The computer logged both the s art and the end time of the 
instruction. 
Results 
The dependent variables under investigation were instruction time (s), mental effort 
during instruction (score 1-9), performance on transfer (score 0-12), mental effort on transfer 
(score 1-9) and time on transfer tasks (s). For all st tistical tests a significance level of .05 was 
applied. Due to technical failure the data of mental effort during instruction was only logged for 
6 participants in each condition. Effect sizes are expressed in terms of omega-squared (ω2 ). 
Table 1 shows the mean scores and standard deviations of the dependent variables for all 
conditions. 
Insert Table 1 about here  
We began our analysis with testing the measures that could be used as covariates for 
further analyses. The mean score on the prior knowledge test was 7.60 (SD = 2.62), indicating 
that the participants were not novices in the domain (the maximum score was 12). An ANOVA 
with the factors Illusion of control and Instructional method revealed neither main effects 
(Illusion of Control: F(1, 84) < 1, ns; Instructional Method: F(2, 84) < 1, ns) nor interaction 
effects (F(2, 84) < 1, ns). For instruction time, the ANOVA also revealed neith r main effects 
(Illusion of Control: F(1, 84) < 1, ns; Instructional Method: F(2, 84) < 1, ns) nor an interaction 
effect (F(2, 84) = 1.88, MSE = 84,695.79, ns). Next, we tested for time on transfer tasks to 
determine whether it should be used as a covariate in further analyses. No differences were found 
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on time on transfer tasks for Illusion of control (F(1, 84) < 1, ns) and Instructional method (F 2, 
84) = 1.47, MSE = 149,871.54, ns). No interaction for Illusion of control and Instructional 
method was found on time on transfer tasks (F(2, 84) < 1, ns). The correlations between the 
dependent variables justified the use of different ANOVAs. Therefore, scores were analyzed 
with 2*3 ANOVAs with the factors Illusion of control (No vs. Yes) and Instructional method 
(Studying-Practicing, Practicing-Studying, Studying-Studying).  
With regard to performance on transfer a main effect of Illusion of control was 
observed (F(1, 84) = 4.29, MSE = 6.73, p = .041, w2 = 4%). Learners in the conditions 
without illusion of control performed better on transfer than learners in the conditions with 
illusion of control (M = 5.46, SD = 2.74 vs. M = 4.32, SD = 2.42). Neither a main effect on 
Instructional method (F(2, 84) < 1, ns) nor an interaction between Illusion of control and 
Instructional method (F(2, 84) = 1.03, MSE = 6.73, ns) was found. 
Subsequently, mental effort during instruction was tested and no difference was found 
for either Illusion of control (F(1, 84 < 1, ns) or Instructional method (F 2, 84 < 1, ns), nor an 
interaction between Illusion of control and Instrucional method was observed (all F(1, 30) < 
1, ns). Finally, mental effort on transfer was tested anno difference was found for either 
Illusion of control (F < 1, ns) or Instructional method (F 2, 84) = 2.07, MSE = 3.00, ns), nor 
an interaction between Illusion of control and Instruc ional method was observed (F(2, 84) = 
1.21, MSE = 3.00, ns). 
Discussion 
These results confirm our first hypothesis which predicted that learners whose expectation 
regarding control matched the actual control that tey could exert, would perform better on 
transfer tasks. In this study all learners were told hat they could select the order of problems. 
Learners who could select the order of the problems (the no illusion of control conditions) 
showed higher transfer performance than learners who thought that they could select the order 
of the problem, whereas they actually received the problems in a fixed order (the illusion of 
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control conditions).  From a cognitive load theory point of view it can be argued that the 
(cognitive) dissonance between the expected and the actual control on the one hand and the 
lack of possibility to resolve this (cognitive) dissonance on the other hand may have engaged 
learners in cognitive activities that did not contribute to learning. For example, learners may 
have tried to figure out why the control was different from what they had expected. 
Consequently, these activities may have posed extraneous cognitive load on the cognitive 
system and thus wasted cognitive capacity that could therwise be used for learning activities 
that contribute to learning. In the condition without illusion of control this cognitive capacity 
could be exerted for genuine learning activities. This pattern, however, is not found in 
differences on perceived mental effort in the conditions with and without illusion of control. 
The mental effort measure that was used did not differentiate between mental effort due to the 
perceived difficulty of the subject matter, the presentation of the instructional material or 
engaging in relevant learning activities. It is possible that the effects in the conditions with or 
without illusion of control on mental effort have nutralized each other. In other words, the 
illusion of control conditions may have imposed rather high extraneous cognitive load and 
low germane cognitive load, whereas the no illusion of control may have imposed rather low 
extraneous cognitive load and high germane cognitive load.  
An implication of providing learner control in the s lection of the problem order is that 
learners indeed show different patterns of selecting problems and that the higher performance 
may be attributable to these different patterns rather than a match between expected and 
actual exerted control. For this reason we further analyzed the patterns of problem selection in 
the conditions with no illusion of control. From the 45 participants in these conditions, 32 
selected the order of the problems as it was present d (see Figure 2) which was the same as 
the fixed order of the problems in the illusion of c ntrol conditions. In these cases learners 
started with the button at the top, then the button below it until the button at the bottom of the 
list. When only the learners were taken into account who selected the problems in the same 
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order as in the illusion of control conditions, theno illusion of control conditions still yielded 
higher performance on transfer (M = 5.62, SD = 2.67 in the no illusion of control conditions 
vs. M = 4.32, SD = 2.42 in the illusion of control conditions). 
The results failed to confirm the second hypothesis predicting that learners in the 
Studying-Practicing condition would perform better on transfer than learners in the Studying-
Studying condition and the Practicing-Studying condition. This hypothesis was based on the 
assumption that the learners were novices. However, as the prior knowledge test has indicated 
the learners in this experiment already possessed some knowledge in the domain. There is 
accumulating evidence that the effectiveness of instructional guidelines depends on the level 
of domain knowledge of learners (Kalyuga, 2005; Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 
2003; Reisslein et al., 2006). In fact, guidelines that are effective for novices in a domain may 
prove to be ineffective or even detrimental when applied to more proficient learners. In this 
respect the learners in this study may have had sufficient prior knowledge to manage the 
cognitive load imposed when they first had to practice and then study an animated model.  
From a theoretical point of view these results contribu e to cognitive load theory. 
Traditionally, cognitive load theory has focused more n instructors making instructional 
decisions rather than learners making these decisions. Nevertheless there are situations, for 
example when the expertise of learners increases, in which a more prominent role for the 
learner seems appropriate (Paas et al., 2003). In addition, one of the premises of cognitive 
load theory comprises that specific instructional design guidelines aim at specific types of 
learning activities, that is, no variety in learning activities is expected. As a consequence the 
pattern of extraneous and germane cognitive load is rather determined. However, as Fisher 
and Ford (1998) have argued, the allocation of effort toward learning activities is also driven 
by individual motivational processes, such as personal goals and interests. For this reason, 
Gerjets and Scheiter (2003) have proposed an augmented model of cognitive load theory in 
which learner goals and processing strategies moderate between the instructional design and 
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the pattern of cognitive load. If learner control is included in this augmented model of 
cognitive load theory, the results of this study suggest that also expectations of learners 
regarding this control should be incorporated in such augmented model.  
From a practical point of view these results have implications as well. The 
development of learning environments that respond t ac ions and choices of learners can be 
quite laborious and therefore relatively expensive. D signers of such environments have to 
take into account how they deal with the expectations f the learners that are going to use the 
learning environment.  
The findings and conclusions provide directions for future research. In this study 
illusion of control was enforced by telling learners beforehand that they could control the 
selection of tasks. Learners in the conditions with illusion of control discovered that they 
could control the selection of tasks only marginally, whereas learners in the conditions 
without illusion of control could select the problems as they were told beforehand. However, 
it is not clear to what extent these learners indeed experienced a mismatch between expected 
and actually exerted control. For this purpose a valid and reliable instrument needs to be 
developed that measures the illusion of control. Moreover, an important avenue for future 
research is to unravel the effect of illusion of contr l on motivation by using questionnaires 
for intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and locus of c ntrol.  
Finally, the results of this study are limited because of the limited scope of the 
instructional material (i.e., probability calculation with more focus on procedural knowledge 
rather than cause-and-effect explanations). Also the number of participants in each condition 
was rather low and replication of the results with larger samples is required. In addition a 
specific type of learners (i.e., pupils of pre-university education) was used who already had 
some level of prior knowledge in the domain of probability calculation. The results were also 
limited because the assessment took place immediately af r the instruction and, 
consequently, nothing can be concluded about the long term effects. Future research is needed 
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to determine whether the results apply to other domains, other types of learners, and if the 
effects will persist on delayed testing. 
To conclude, the results of this study suggest that merely providing learner control in a 
learning context without considering the expectations f learners regarding the control can 





Observational Learning from Animated     22 
References 
Casey, C. (1996). Incorporating cognitive apprenticeship in multi-media. Educational 
Technology, Research and Development, 44, 74–84. 
Chee, Y. C.  (1995). Cognitive apprenticeship and its application to the teaching of Smalltalk 
in a multimedia interactive learning environment. I structional Science, 23, 133–161. 
Chi, M. T. H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M. W., Reimann, P. & Glaser, R. (1989). Self-
explanations: How learners study and use examples in l arning to solve problems. 
Cognitive Science, 13, 145–182. 
Clarebout, G.,  Elen, J., Johnson, W. L., & Shaw, E. (2002). Animated pedagogical agents: 
An opportunity to be grasped? Journal of Educational Multimedia and Hypermedia, 
11, 267–286. 
Collins, A., Brown, J. S., & Newman, S. E. (1989). Cognitive apprenticeship: Teaching the 
crafts of reading, writing, and mathematics. In L. B. Resnick (Ed.), Knowing, learning, 
and instruction: Essays in honor of Robert Glaser (pp. 453–494). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Elliot, A. J., & Devine, P. G., (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance as 
psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 382–394. 
Fazey, D. M. A, & Fazey, J. A. (2001). The potential for autonomy in learning: perceptions of 
competence, motivation and locus of control in first-year undergraduate students. 
Studies in Higher Education, 26, 345-260. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Fisher, F.L., & Ford, J. K. (1998). Differential eff cts of learner effort and goal orientation on 
two learning outcomes. Personnel Psychology, 51, 397–420. 
Observational Learning from Animated     23 
Gerjets, P., & Scheiter, K. (2003). Goal configurations and processing strategies as 
moderators between instructional design and cognitive load: Evidence from hypertext-
based instruction. Educational Psychologist, 38, 33–41. 
Jonassen, D. (1999). Designing constructivist learning environments. In C. M. Reigeluth 
(Ed.), Instructional design theories and models: A new paradigm of instructional 
theory (Vol. II) (pp. 215–239). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Kalyuga, S.  (2005). Prior knowledge principle in multimedia learning. In R. Mayer (Ed.), 
Cambridge handbook of multimedia learning (pp. 325–338). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kalyuga, S., Ayres, P., Chandler, P., & Sweller, J. (2003). The expertise reversal effect. 
Educational Psychologist, 38, 23–31. 
Kay, J. (2001). Learner control.  User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 11, 111–127. 
Kinzie, M. B. (1990). Requirements and benefits of effective interactive instruction: Learner 
control, self-regulation, and continuing motivation. Educational Technology Research 
and Development, 38,  5–21. 
Langer, E. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 
311–328. 
Lepper, M. R. (1985). Microcomputers in education: Motivational and social issues. 
American Psychologist, 40(1), 1-18. 
Lin, B., & Hsieh, C. (2001). Web-based teaching andlearner control: A research review. 
Computer & Education, 37, 377–386. 
Mayer, R. (2001). Multimedia learning. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
McCullagh, P., Weiss, M. R.., & Ross, D. (1989). Modeling considerations in motor skill 
acquisition and performance: An integrated approach. In K. Pandolf (Ed.), Exercise 
and sport science reviews (Vol. 17, pp. 475–513). Baltimore: Williams & Wadkins. 
Observational Learning from Animated     24 
Niemiec, R. P., Sikorski, C. & Walberg, H. J.  (1996). Learner-control effects: A review of 
reviews and a meta-analysis. Journal of Educational Computing Research, 15, 157– 
174. 
Paas, F. (1992). Training strategies for attaining transfer of problem-solving skill in statistics: 
A cognitive-load approach. Journal of Educational Psychology, 84, 429–434. 
Paas, F., Renkl, A., & Sweller, J. (2003). Cognitive load theory and instructional design: 
Recent developments. Educational Psychologist, 38, 1–4. 
Paas, F., Renkl, A., & Sweller, J. (2004). Cognitive load theory: Instructional implications of 
the interaction between information structures and cognitive architecture. Instructional 
Science, 32, 1–8. 
Paas, F., Tuovinen, van Merriënboer, J. J. G., & Darabi, A.A. (2005). A motivational 
perspective on the relation between mental effort and performance: Optimizing learner 
involvement in instruction. Educational Technology, Research and Development, 53, 
25–34. 
Pallak, M. S., & Pittman, T. S. (1972). General motivational effect of dissonance arousal. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21, 349–358. 
Peters, M. L., Godaert, G. L. R., Ballieux, R. E., van Vliet, M., Willemsen, J. J., Sweep, F. C. 
G. J., & Heijnen, C. J. (1998). Cardiovascular and e ocrine responses to 
experimental stress: Effects of mental effort and controllability. 
Psychoneuroendicrinology, 23, 1–17. 
Reisslein, J., Atkinson, R. K., Seeling, P., & Reisslein, M. (2006). Encountering the expertise 
reversal effect with a computer-based environment on electrical circuit analysis. 
Learning and Instruction, 16, 92–103. 
Renkl, A. (1997). Learning from worked-out examples: A study on individual differences. 
Cognitive Science, 21, 1–29. 
Observational Learning from Animated     25 
Renkl, A., & Atkinson, R. K. (2002). Learning from examples: Fostering self-explanations in 
computer-based learning environments. Interactive Learning Environments, 10, 105–
119. 
Renkl, A., & Atkinson, R. K. (2003). Structuring the transition from example study to 
problem solving in cognitive skill acquisition :A cognitive load perspective. 
Educational Psychologist, 38, 15–22.  
Roy, M., & Chi, M. T. H., (2005). The self-explanation principle in multimedia learning. In 
R. Mayer (Ed.), Cambridge handbook of multimedia learning (pp. 271–286). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Shea, C. H., Wright, D. L., Wulf, G., Whitacre, C. (2000). Physical and observational practice 
afford unique learning opportunities. Journal of Motor Behavior, 32, 27–36. 
Skinner, E. A. (1996). A guide to constructs of contr l. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 71, 549–570. 
Sweller, J. (1988). Cognitive load during problem solving: Effects on learning. Cognitive 
Science, 12, 257–285. 
Sweller, J. (1999). Instructional design in technical areas. Melbourne: ACER. 
Sweller, J. (2004). Instructional design consequences of an analogy between evolution by 
natural selection and human cognitive architecture. Instructional Science, 32, 9–31. 
Sweller, J., & Cooper, G. A. (1985). The use of worked examples as a substitute for problem 
solving in learning algebra. Cognition and Instruction, 2, 59–89. 
Sweller, J., van Merriënboer, J. J. G., & Paas, F. (1998). Cognitive architecture and 
instructional design. Educational Psychology Review, 10, 251–296. 
Trafton, J. G., & Reiser, B. (1993). The contributions of studying examples and solving 
problems to skill acquisition. In Cognitive Science Society (Ed.), Proceedings of the 
15th annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1017–1022). Mahwah, 
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Observational Learning from Animated     26 
Van Merriënboer, J. J. G. (1997). Training complex cognitive skills. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ:Educational Technology Publications. 
Van Merriënboer, J. J. G., & Sweller, J. (2005). Cognitive load theory and complex learning: 
Recent developments and future directions. Educational Psychology Review, 17, 147–
177. 
Van Merriënboer, J. J. G., & Ayres, P. (2005). Research on cognitive load theory and its 
design implications for e-learning. Educational Technology, Research and 
Development, 53, 5–13. 
Weeks, D. L., & Anderson, L. P. (2000). The interaction of observational learning with overt 
practice: Effects on motor skill learning. Acta Psychologica, 104, 259–271. 
Wetzel, D. C., Radtke, P. H., & Stern, H. W. (1994). Instructional effectiveness of video 
media. Hillsdale/Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Williams, M. D. (1996). Learner-control and instructional technologies. In D.H. Jonassen 
(Ed.), Handbook of research for educational communications and technology (pp. 
957–983). New York: MacMillan. 
Wittrock, M. C. (1974). Learning as a generative activity. Educational Psychologist, 11, 87–
95. 
Wulf, G., & Shea, C. H. (2002). Principles derived from the study of simple skills do not 
generalize to complex skill learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 185–211. 
 
Observational Learning from Animated     27 
Table 1  
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations (between brackets) on Prior Knowledge and the Dependent Variables for all Conditions  
  
Illusion of control 
 
No illusion of control 
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Note: mental effort during instruction is based on data of 6 participants per cell.
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Screen shot of the ‘Checking mobiles’ animated model which displays nd explains why this is a ‘drawing without replacement’.  
Figure 2. The screen with buttons from which learners could select problems in the illusion of conditions. 
Figure 3. The screen with buttons from which learners could select problems in the no illusion of conditions. 
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